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Editorial

Human centered processes: Toward a naturalistic decision making paradigm

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The articles in this special issue originate in a mini-EURO conference, “Distributed Decision Making and Man-Machine Cooperation,” under the Human Centered Processes (HCP) umbrella in Luxembourg in May, 2003; a conference that in turn built on the work of two earlier HCP conferences in Luxembourg (1994) and Brest, France (1999), respectively. We wish to begin this article and the introduction to this special issue by first briefly looking at where we have been. In the 1994 Luxembourg meeting, the general focus was placed on the natural cognition; on the notion that important decisions exist as parts of integrated complex systems. This emphasis (cf. Barthélemy et al., 1994) constituted a contrast to the prevailing cognitive science focus on relatively abstract and highly structured tasks. The 1994 ambition was to utilize the full cognitive science core—psychology, philosophy, and computer science—in operational research (OR), and to tackle the problem of understanding and modelling human expertise in industrial settings. This emphasis constituted an early response to criticism of traditional OR practises as inattentive to cognitive issues; notably the notion that the knowledge and expertise that human agents have acquired over time has not received due attention. Traditional OR models sometimes have not been seen as relevant for practise, as builders of strong models have a tendency to try to fit reality to the models, not the models to reality. Also, expertise is not very well covered, as the models tend to be timeless. As a response, in

the 1994 meeting an attempt was made to address issues related to the mastering and reduction of complexity by experts. Similarly, numerous presentations in the 1999 meeting focused on the reuse of knowledge, the recycling of expertise, and the documenting of knowledge and expertise. At this time, there was also a sense of the need to scale back estimates of the usefulness of expert systems and frameworks based on the ‘general problem solver’ (Newell and Simon, 1963) as universal remedies. Natural human cognitive capacities in many ways were more robust than the artificial intelligence literature suggested. Human cognition certainly has limits (cf. the vast literature on biases and fallacies, e.g. Kahneman et al., 1982), yet knowledgeable humans frequently have been shown to be hugely capable (cf. Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group, 1999).

Following up on the foundation laid in the 1994 meeting, the 1999 Brest conference was oriented toward knowledge and information processing and expertise; toward knowledge engineering in industry, including discovery of rules, updating and maintenance of rules, and rule-based systems. Multi-attribute models designed to aid complex human decision-making constituted another important component of the meeting (cf. Lenca, 1999; Bathélemy et al., 2002). These models maintained a clearly normative element, countering a noticeable drift toward process description and process modelling in cognition in general and decision making in particular. Key arguments in this

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71 important emphasis shift during the Brest meeting
 72 are exemplified by presentations by Shanteau (cf.
 73 Shanteau et al., 2002) on defining and measuring
 74 expertise, by Montgomery on operationalizing
 75 decision processes (cf. Montgomery, 1983), and
 76 in papers focused on Barthélemy and Mullet's
 77 (1986) moving basis heuristic. Gradually, and as
 78 a result of the heuristic nature of the methods,
 79 the emphasis also began to shift toward a stronger
 80 recognition of the importance of ecological valida-
 81 tion. Also, the linking of cognition and decision
 82 theory had progressed to a point where we were
 83 able to start to build a home for human expertise.

84 The 2003 Luxembourg meeting in a sense com-
 85 pleted a cycle, focusing on decision psychology
 86 and process descriptive frameworks, not any long-
 87 er on decision theory per se, and on complex (often
 88 distributed) decision-making and human-machine
 89 cooperation in naturalistic settings (Bisdorff,
 90 2003). Importantly, in the human-machine track,
 91 the focus was on the naturalization of machines,
 92 not on the machinization of humans. Equally
 93 importantly, several presentations again focused
 94 on ecological validation. This emphasis was
 95 strongly supported in two practitioner/academic
 96 panels on critical decision-making: one on hu-
 97 man-machine cooperation in aviation, one on mil-
 98 itary and critical systems. We believe that a focus
 99 on critical decision making helps make the under-
 100 lying decision processes both more salient and
 101 explicit.

102 The evolution of thought and the contrast to
 103 our preceding conferences are clearly evident in
 104 the three keynote addresses delivered by Todd,
 105 Slovic, and Svenson. Todd's presentation concen-
 106 trated on the notion of 'simple heuristics that make
 107 us smart' and on ecological rationality, Slovic's
 108 presentation addressed the importance of under-
 109 standing affect in decision making and reasoning,
 110 whereas Svenson's presentation spanned both
 111 operational decision processes and key aspect
 112 measuring issues. Svenson also tested decision
 113 theoretic predictions in naturalistic settings, thus
 114 reconnecting to our earlier emphases. In general,
 115 the 2003 HCP conference was characterized by
 116 the strongest yet focus on process descriptive
 117 frameworks.

Looking forward, it is important to explore 118
 when and under what circumstances particular 119
 decision models, processes, and procedures apply, 120
 and to which extent the cognition, reasoning, and 121
 decision making of experts differ from those of do- 122
 main novices, and, equally importantly, from the 123
 processes involved when people make everyday 124
 decisions. For example, it has been argued that 125
 generalized decision heuristics are at work when 126
 people make everyday decisions (often of rather 127
 little consequence), and when people make deci- 128
 sions in more complex environments where they 129
 lack experience, but that experts make decisions 130
 at least in part based on specialized (domain spe- 131
 cific) procedures. It is also increasingly important 132
 to explore how and when experts can be aided with 133
 decision support systems (cf. Lundberg, in press). 134

We divide the contributions to this special HCP 135
 issue into four categories: *Decision Making Pro-* 136
cesses; Organizations, Distributed Systems, and 137
Human-Machine Interfaces; Preference Modeling; 138
and Human Factors. Under the *Decision Making* 139
Processes umbrella, Todd presents four classes of 140
 simple heuristics that use limited information— 141
 recognition-based heuristics, one-reason decision 142
 mechanisms, multiple-cue elimination strategies, 143
 and quick sequential search mechanisms—applied 144
 to environments from stock market investment to 145
 judging intentions of other organisms, to choosing 146
 a mate. The findings that ecological rationality can 147
 be achieved with limited information are also used 148
 to indicate how our mind's design, relying on deci- 149
 sion mechanisms tuned to specific environments, 150
 should be taken into account in our technology's 151
 design, creating environments that can enable bet- 152
 ter decisions. 153

The paper by Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and 154
 MacGregor introduces a theoretical framework 155
 that describes the importance of affect in guiding 156
 judgments and decisions. Affective responses 157
 occur rapidly and automatically. Slovic and his 158
 co-authors argue that reliance on such feelings 159
 can be characterized as "the affect heuristic". 160
 Some important practical implications resulting 161
 from ways in which this heuristic impacts our daily 162
 lives are also discussed. 163

Svenson and Salo present two studies investi- 164
 gating how decision makers characterize alterna- 165

166 tives in important real-life decisions (that the par-
 167 ticipants have had experience with) with a very
 168 high degree of personal involvement (to leave a
 169 partner, choose an education, and choose a home).
 170 As predicted by decision theory, consequence,
 171 probability, and value constitute important as-
 172 pects. Svenson and Salo also include positive and
 173 negative affects, finding that value and emotion
 174 are uncorrelated. Principal component analyses re-
 175 vealed the existence of one factor for positive af-
 176 fect/emotions and another factor for negative
 177 affect/emotions, providing evidence against the
 178 use of bipolar scales.

179 Lundberg explores key components of the mul-
 180 tiple constraint satisfaction framework in a series
 181 of experiments set in complex and ambiguous do-
 182 mains. All cases show the prevalence and impor-
 183 tance of purposeful information structuring. The
 184 participants gradually generate coherence, even
 185 in cases without increasing information, as evi-
 186 denced in increasing differentiation of alternatives
 187 and simplified knowledge structures.

188 In the *Organizations, Distributed Systems, and*
 189 *Human–Machine Interfaces* cluster, Fioretti argues
 190 that no procedure is available to predict the extent
 191 to which and the pace at which the production
 192 time will decrease with the total number of units
 193 produced, i.e. one consequence of organizational
 194 learning. This article links the parameters of the
 195 only available disaggregate model of the learning
 196 curve to measurable features of the component
 197 units of an organization.

198 The Antunes, Melo, and Costa paper presents
 199 the argumentation and data structuring models
 200 of a collaborative computational tool. The system
 201 assists between-participant discussions and those
 202 with a coordinator. The *Collaboration Studio* dif-
 203 fers from other collaboration tools in that it aims
 204 at preserving a trace of the knowledge develop-
 205 ment path.

206 Papamichail and Papamichail describe a clus-
 207 tering algorithm that, combined with a spatial data
 208 structure, provides an effective implementation of
 209 distributed interactive decision aids in e-com-
 210 merce. The tool helps the consumer explore prefer-
 211 ences, search for and aggregate product
 212 information, and thus improve the purchase
 213 decision.

The Michalowski, Kersten, Wilk, and Slovinski
 paper presents an operational mobile, hand-held
 clinical child patient triage support system, aiding
 physicians in a Hospital's Emergency Department.
 The interface design and the interaction between
 triage expert and system are discussed.

In the *Preference Modeling* section, Renaud,
 Thibault, Lanouette, Kiss, Zaras, and Fonteix
 compare two multicriteria analysis methods, the
 Rough Set Method (RSM) and the Net Flow
 Method (NFM), applied to paper manufacturing.
 Importantly, both methods use domain expert
 knowledge in the form of decision rules and
 thresholds, respectively.

de Smet introduces a formal framework for
 modelling multicriteria auctions in the context of
 limited comparability of bids, a situation common
 in e-procurement and e-commerce.

The Choquet integral and its associated capaci-
 ties allow the modeler to take into account realistic
 interactions between criteria, but their effective use
 suffers from a notorious complexity problem.
 Marichal proposes an instrument, the k -intolerant
 capacities, for overcoming these computational
 problems.

Joseph, Chan, Hiroux, and Weil propose a new
 soft preference constraint, global consistency con-
 straints based on customizable level consistency,
 and an algorithm for generating quality solutions
 for multicriteria optimization problems.

Finally, two papers address *Human Factors*.
 Annualizing work plans and schedules requires
 taking into account not only relaxed optimization
 constraints but also more realistic and human cen-
 tered constraints. In this setting, Corominas, Lusa,
 and Pastor propose a model providing essential
 quantitative information for establishing the
 trade-off between weekly flexibility and economic
 or working-time reduction compensation.

Zamiska, Jaber, and Kher investigate worker
 learning and forgetting phenomena in a dual re-
 source constrained system setting. In this model
 it is assumed that a work task has separate cog-
 nitive and motor requirements. The authors show
 that the task-type affects the performance of train-
 ing and deployment policies in such systems.

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Raymond Bisdorff

*Applied Mathematics Unit**University of Luxembourg**162a, Avenue de la Faiencerie**L-1511 Luxembourg**E-mail address: raymond.bisdorff@uni.lu*

Gustav Lundberg

*John F. Donahue Graduate School of Business &**A.J. Palumbo School of Business Administration**Duquesne University**600 Forbes Avenue**Pittsburgh, PA 15282**USA*